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     I.          Introduction
Since the founding of the country, the United States 
has long been a popular destination of immigration. 
According to American Community Survey (ACS) 
data, in 2015, the immigration population in the US 
was more than 43.3 million, which constituted 13.5% 
of the total population in the country (Zong & Bat-
alova, 2017). Individuals immigrate to the US for a 
variety of reasons, such as better employment, family, 
and education. One immigrant group, in particular, has 
received increasing attention from labor economists: 
refugees. Unlike economic immigrants whose primary 
goal is to search for better economic opportunities, 
refugees flee to the US in order to escape persecution 
and war in their home country. In other words, eco-
nomic immigrants choose to come to the US under 
their free will, whereas refugees do not have much lib-
erty to choose when and where they would be resettled 
for humanitarian purposes. Hence refugees, in gen-
eral, may have less time and fewer resources in their 
home country to prepare themselves for settlement in 
the US, namely acquiring English skills to increase 
the likelihood of employment, than economic immi-
grants do. Since refugees are less likely to attain such 
US-specific labor skills prior to immigration, they 
are more likely to be disadvantaged in the US labor 
market when compared to non-refugee immigrants and 
natives. 
This paper aims to investigate how refugees per-
form in the US labor market in relation to economic 
immigrants and natives, and hence evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the US humanitarian resettlement program. 
It is organized in the following order: literature review, 
theoretical model, data and methodology, descriptive 
statistics analysis, empirical model and results, and 
conclusion. 
I will refer to both refugees and asylees in the US 
when I use the term “refugees” in this paper. This is 
because although both groups seek humanitarian aid, 
they are given different definitions in the US. Refugee 
status is granted to someone who is outside of the US 
when applying for humanitarian protection, whereas 
asylum is granted, either affirmatively or defensively, 
to someone who is already present in the US or at a 
US port of entry (Department of Homeland Security, 
2015). Despite the minor differences in the definition 
of these two groups, it is assumed that they are fun-
damentally the same when it comes to the level of 
US-specific human capital upon arrival in the US. 
Refugees from the following five countries 
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are selected for my assimilation analysis: Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Romania, Russia and other USSR nations, 
and Iraq. The labor market outcomes, such as the em-
ployment rate, usual hours worked per week, and real 
wages, of these refugees are compared to those of all 
non-refugee immigrants and all natives respectively. 
Both descriptive statistics and Oaxaca wage decompo-
sition analyses are conducted to estimate the effects of 
refugee status on an individual’s labor market perfor-
mance. Human capital and demographic variables are 
taken into account as well. Data across two time peri-
ods, 2000 and 2011-2015, are analyzed to determine if 
assimilation occurs for these refugees in the US labor 
market. 
     II.          Literature Review
Although there exists a limited amount of economic 
literature on the specific topic of refugee assimilation 
in the host country labor market, a vast amount of 
research has been done on the labor market integra-
tion of immigrants in general in a wide range of host 
countries. As Aiyar et al. (2016) pointed out in their 
study on the recent waves of refugees in the Europe-
an Union, existing literature on immigration seldom 
distinguishes between economic immigrants and 
refugees when analyzing the assimilation process of 
immigrants. The researchers found that immigrants, 
in general, had lower labor market participation rates, 
employment rates, and wages when compared to 
natives. They showed that the slow integration pro-
cess for migrants in the host countries is mostly due to 
lack of language skills and transferable job qualifica-
tions, as well as the presence of barriers to job search. 
However, over time immigrants could improve their 
language skills or obtain more relevant job experience, 
and hence the gap between immigrants and natives 
diminished in the labor market. Moreover, the re-
searchers asserted that refugees may experience more 
restrictions in the host country labor markets as there 
are many legal constraints on asylum applications 
and employment. They also asserted that economic 
immigrants have the advantage over refugees in labor 
market assimilation because they could choose their 
destination country to maximize future employment 
outcomes, whereas the latter’s primary goal would be 
to seek asylum to maximize personal safety (Aiyar et 
al.,2016). 
Bevelander (2016) arrived at similar con-
clusions as Aiyar et al. (2016) when he conducted a 
more detailed comparison on the employment levels 
and earnings of refugees to those of family reunion 
migrants and labor migrants in Sweden, Canada, the 
US, and the Netherlands. He found that in the Euro-
pean countries and Canada, refugees started at a lower 
employment level upon arrival at host countries, but 
eventually they caught up economically with family 
reunion migrants. However, refugees integrated more 
slowly into host countries’ labor market than labor mi-
grants did. This is because a number of host countries 
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hold screening processes to ensure smoother labor 
market integration for economic immigrants, and other 
countries have policies that admit economic immi-
grants to match the demand for certain jobs in the host 
country. However, the US is different from the other 
three countries examined in this respect; in the US, 
there is more focus on family relationship immigra-
tion flows than on economic migrants. Refugees and 
family reunion immigrants did not enter the country to 
seek employment primarily, so information on the host 
country’s labor market situation is of less importance 
for their migration destination. Moreover, Bevelander 
found that labor market integration is mostly depen-
dent on individual human capital, such as the invest-
ment in schooling and education both in the source 
and the host country, and labor experience in the host 
country. Hence loss and depreciation of human capital 
and credentials during the asylum procedure negative-
ly affect refugees’ labor market integration. Factors 
such as age, marital status, gender, and country of 
origin also play a role in determining the economic 
integration of various immigrant categories. Beveland-
er asserted that intake policies in host countries do not 
provide adequate assistance to refugees attempting to 
integrate into the local labor market, which contrib-
utes to the poorer economic performance when com-
pared to economic and family reunion migrants and is 
especially significant during the first few years after 
arrival. 
In their study on the phenomenon of “welfare 
migration” to a typical welfare state, Norway, Brats-
berg, Raaum, and Røed (2014) examined the lifecycle 
patterns of employment, earnings and social insurance 
claims of immigrants for up to 40 years after arrival. 
The regression results showed that the difference in 
living standards between the source country and the 
destination country is a particularly important pre-
dictor for their long-term labor market performance. 
Immigrants from countries with similar income levels 
as Norway tended to perform well in the Norwegian 
labor market at similar levels as natives. On the other 
hand, immigrants from low-income developing coun-
tries tended to stay in Norway for longer and have 
higher risks of non-employment and social insurance 
dependency. When studying the labor market perfor-
mance of refugees and family immigrants in Norway, 
the researchers found that these immigrant groups 
demonstrated clear signs of assimilation during their 
first decade in Norway, with employment rates and 
earnings levels approaching, yet never fully catching 
up with, those of similar natives. However, after this 
initial period upon arrival, assimilation halted as the 
performance differentials between these immigrant 
groups and natives widened again. 
In a similar research paper on the labor mar-
ket integration of refugees in Norway, Godøy (2017) 
examined how conditions in the local labor markets at 
the time of immigration influence later employment 
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outcomes for refugees. She found that in 2012, the 
employment rate of refugees in Norway was 50.1%, in 
contrast to the 68.7% of the entire population and the 
62.8% among all immigrants. She then confirmed the 
link between human capital and labor market perfor-
mance by asserting that refugees face higher barriers 
to entry in the labor market due to limited language 
skills and lower educational attainment, and hence as 
a group, they have lower earnings and employment 
rates. On the other hand, it is shown that being placed 
in a labor market where other non-OECD immigrants 
do well would increase labor earnings for refugees up 
to 6 years after their immigration. 
Poutvaara and Wech (2016) compared the la-
bor market performance of refugees in the United Stat-
ed and in EU countries (Germany, Sweden, Denmark, 
and the UK) and investigated the factors that may 
contribute to the different labor outcomes of refugees 
between the European countries and the United States. 
They discovered that the employment rate of refugees 
increased with the length of stay in the host countries, 
but complete parity with natives was not achieved. 
The researchers explained the lower employment rate 
among refugees by stating that psychological traumas 
due to war from their home countries discourage both 
genders to participate in the labor force. However, 
the employment rate of female refugees was signifi-
cantly lower than that of male refugees, which the 
researchers attributed to the higher number of children 
refugees have and cultural barriers that discourage 
females from participating in the labor market. When 
looking at the employment rate of different refugee 
groups, they found that refugees of both genders from 
Latin America had the highest employment rate, and 
those from the Middle East had the lowest rates. The 
researchers asserted that the difference in the em-
ployment rates between these two groups cannot be 
explained by varying education attainment since both 
groups have similar education levels. The research-
ers also stated that refugees from countries that have 
been affected by war for longer tend to have lower 
education attainment due to more restricted access to 
educational institutions. The researchers concluded 
by saying that the US is more successful at integrat-
ing refugees into the labor market than EU countries 
are because of the country’s rich history with receiv-
ing immigrants and thus the higher availability of 
low-paying entry-level jobs.   
 Overall, existing literature suggests that refu-
gees perform worse initially than non-refugee immi-
grants and natives do in the host country labor market 
as supported by the findings of Aiyar et al. (2016), 
Bevelander (2016), and Godøy (2017). However, 
over time, there are signs of assimilation as refugees 
improve their labor market performance (Bratsberg, 
Raaum, & Røed, 2014; Poutvaara & Wech, 2016). I 
would contribute to this field of literature by examin-
ing the labor market outcomes of refugees in the US 
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in comparison to those of non-refugee (economic) 
immigrants and natives. 
     III.          Theoretical Model
This section presents the theoretical component of 
this paper, which consists of human capital theory and 
discrimination theory. The human capital theory states 
that human capital is the income-generating worth of 
an individual, and it is a function of his or her produc-
tive skills and knowledge (Rosen, 2008). Traditionally, 
human capital is measured by an individual’s educa-
tional attainment; the higher the educational attain-
ment level, the greater the individual’s human capital. 
Higher human capital thus leads to higher labor pro-
ductivity, and higher labor productivity leads to higher 
labor earnings according to this human capital theory. 
Age is also a proxy for measuring human capital, as it 
is assumed that labor market experience, a key deter-
minant of human capital, increases as an individual 
ages. However, it is important to note that the initial 
human capital levels of refugees, which is approximat-
ed by their educational attainment and age, are only 
partially transferable upon arrival in their host country 
(Cortes, 2004). Hence it is crucial for these refugees 
to obtain country-specific human capital to be able to 
compete in the host country labor markets. Therefore, 
in this paper, in addition to the educational attainment 
level and age of refugees, I also analyze how English 
proficiency, which is a US-specific human capital, im-
pacts the wages of the different refugee groups. Since 
refugees are less likely to have country-specific human 
capital before seeking resettlement in the host country, 
and country-specific human capital takes time to gain, 
I hypothesize that refugees would perform worse than 
economic migrants and natives when they first arrive 
in the host country, but eventually catch up as assimi-
lation occurs over time. 
Moreover, discrimination from employers 
might play a part in determining the refugees’ labor 
earnings in the US. I will approach the discrimination 
theory from two perspectives: taste-based discrimina-
tion and statistical discrimination. Statistical discrimi-
nation addresses the inequality between demographic 
groups caused by non-prejudiced stereotypes that are 
unrelated to racial and gender biases (Moro, 2009). As 
current literature suggests, refugees have limited coun-
try-specific human capital, such as English skills, upon 
arrival in the host country, and therefore they might 
be subjected to statistical discrimination due to their 
perceived lower human capital as a group. Employers 
who practice statistical discrimination are not able to 
accurately assess the potential productivity of an indi-
vidual but can estimate the productivity of the group 
that the individual is in; therefore, they tend to use per-
ceived group performance as an indicator for the likely 
performance of the individual. These employers may 
be less inclined to hire refugees as they believe that 
refugees, in general, have lower productivity because 
of the previous labor market performance of refugees. 
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Moreover, because these discriminating employers 
make their hiring decisions of individual refugee 
candidates based on the perceived performance of all 
refugees, by avoiding to hire refugees as a group, they 
aim to increase the productivity and hence competi-
tiveness of their firms. Due to their competitive edge, 
these employers are highly likely to persevere or even 
grow in the long-run, and therefore hiring decisions 
in the labor market based on statistical discrimination 
against refugees are unlikely to disappear and might 
even worsen.
On the other hand, taste-based discrimina-
tion refers to how unjustified prejudicial feelings of 
individual members of a majority group could lead 
to negative employment outcomes for members of 
a discriminated-against group (Charles & Guryan, 
2009). Taste-based discrimination can be attributed 
to common discriminatory factors in the labor market 
such as national origin, race, gender, and religion. 
Current literature also points out that discrimination 
exists even within the refugee population; refugees of 
certain national origin may experience greater degrees 
of discrimination from employers than other refugees, 
causing them to perform more poorly in the labor 
market. For example, Capps et al. (2015) found that 
although Vietnamese and Cuban refugees had similar 
English proficiency and educational attainment lev-
els upon their arrival in the US, these two groups had 
significantly different economic outcomes in FY2009-
11.  Up to 56% of Cuban refugees received household 
income below twice the poverty line, whereas only 
35% of the Vietnamese refugees did. This suggests 
that human capital is unlikely to be the only contrib-
uting factor in determining labor wages. Fortunately, 
it is likely that this kind of taste-based discrimination 
against refugees would eventually disappear in the 
labor market as explained by the Becker model below 
(Borjas, 2016). 
In Figure 1, I have simplified the labor market 
to consist of only refugees and native workers. The 
vertical axis measures the ratio of refugee wages to 
native wages, and the horizontal axis measures the 
number of refugee workers. It is assumed that na-
tive wages are fixed but that refugee wages can vary 
depending on their labor demand and supply. Employ-
ers who have no preference of native workers over 
refugees would be willing to pay an equal amount of 
wages for both groups (the ratio of refugee wages to 
native wages equals to one) as shown by the horizon-
tal portion of the demand curve for refugee workers. 
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This would continue until there are no more non-dis-
criminating employers left in the labor market (Point 
A) who are willing to pay refugees at a wage ratio of 
one, and we enter the downward-sloping portion of 
the demand curve. Here we start with employers with 
a lower extent of taste-based discrimination against 
refugees then gradually move on to those with more 
distaste against refugees. This indicates that after L
R
 
number of refugees are hired in the labor market, 
the remaining prejudiced employers would only hire 
refugees if the wage ratio is lower than one. The lower 
wage is to compensate the prejudiced employers for 
employing the less preferred refugees, and the more 
discriminating an employer is against refugees, the 
lower the wage ratio has to be for the employer to hire 
refugees.
The labor wages of refugees are also deter-
mined by the supply of refugee workers in the labor 
market. The greater the supply of refugee workers, the 
more likely that the labor market equilibrium would 
fall at the downward-sloping portion of the demand 
curve where employers have a greater preference for 
native workers over refugees as shown by the position 
of the three supply curves in Figure 1. As the supply 
of refugee workers increases in the labor market, for 
example, a shift from S
R
 to S
R
’, the equilibrium wag-
es for these workers decrease due to the presence of 
discriminatory employers. However, eventually, this 
phenomenon would disappear as discriminatory em-
ployers face a higher labor cost when choosing to hire 
native workers over refugee workers. For instance, at 
Point B, discriminatory employers would have to pay 
33% more for native workers than non-discriminatory 
employers. The labor costs for discriminatory em-
ployers increase along the demand curve; at Point C, 
they would need to pay 50% more for native workers. 
Since higher labor costs decrease the competitiveness 
of firms, in the long-run these discriminatory employ-
ers would either have to terminate their discriminatory 
behaviors or face potential exit from the market. To 
further investigate the extent to which discrimination 
affects the labor market assimilation of refugees in 
the US labor market, I would incorporate the Oaxaca 
decomposition in my empirical design, and this will be 
discussed more in depth in the empirical model sec-
tion. 
Drawing from conclusions based on existing 
literature and economic theories, I hypothesize that 
compared to economic migrants and natives, refu-
gees would perform worse in the labor market upon 
arrival in the US. This is because they have less time 
and fewer resources to acquire desirable US-specif-
ic labor skills prior to their entry into the country as 
well as taste-based and statistical discrimination from 
employers. However, over time assimilation would 
occur for refugees as they can obtain more US-specif-
ic human capital, such as English skills and US labor 
market experience, and discrimination may diminish 
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in the long-run as employers learn more about refugee 
workers and as non-discriminatory employers have a 
competitive advantage and increase their demand for 
refugee labor. 
     IV.          Data & Methodology
The data used in this research are obtained from the 
2000 5% US Census surveys and the 2011-2015 1% 
American Community Survey (ACS) conducted by 
the U.S. Census Bureau. I extracted data across these 
years to better capture the assimilation process of 
refugees and economic immigrants. When extracting 
my data, I limited my data selection to working-age 
individuals by identifying those who are between age 
18 and 65 when the surveys were conducted. Various 
sources are used to determine the various refugee 
flows to the US. Since the US Census and ACS data 
do not specify the immigration type of the respon-
dents, I have to turn to alternative methods of defining 
what constitutes a refugee flow to the US. After care-
ful consideration, I decided that if the sum of refugees 
and asylees from a country makes up at least 70% of 
the total immigration flow to the US in a given year, 
then that country’s immigrants during that year are 
included in my definition of major refugee groups in 
the US. 
The primary source of refugee, asylee, and im-
migrant data is the Statistical Yearbook of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Services, which in 2002 is 
renamed the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics under 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  How-
ever, the statistical yearbooks do not contain refugee 
or asylee data before 1982, and therefore the earliest 
refugee waves from Vietnam and Cambodia prior 
to 1982 are identified using data from the Migration 
Policy Institute (MPI) instead of the 70% rule. It can 
be seen in Figure 2 that the arrival of Vietnamese refu-
gees in the US peaked in 1975, and then between 1978 
and 1983. Combining the MPI data with the statistical 
yearbooks data, I defined the Vietnamese immigrants 
in the ACS data who immigrated to the United States 
in 1975, or between 1978 and 1988, as refugees. 
Similarly, Cambodian immigrants in the ACS data 
who immigrated to the US between 1978 and 1985 
are defined as refugees. It is important to note that 
due to the limitations of identifying refugees through 
the 70% rule, some immigrants who are defined as 
refugees might have been economic or family-based 
immigrants, and hence the results might be biased.  
However, based on information I have learned from 
non-ACS sources such as the DHS and MPI, I am 
confident that most respondents in my refugee waves 
are in fact refugees or asylees. 
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Figure 2: Vietnamese Refugee Arrivals and 
Vietnamese Immigrants Granted Lawful Permanent 
Residence (LPR) as Refugees and Asylees or through 
Family Ties, 1975-2014 (Zong & Batalova, 2016)
Using the DHS and MPI data and the 70% 
rule, I identified eight major refugee groups that have 
arrived in the US between 1975 and 2015: 
• Vietnamese refugee wave: Year of immigration is 
1975 or 1978 through 1988
• Cambodian refugee wave: Year of immigration is 
1978 through 1985
• Afghan refugee wave: Year of immigration is 1982 
through 1988
• Romanian refugee wave: Year of immigration is 
1982 through 1990
• Russian and other USSR nations refugee wave: 
Year of immigration is 1987 through 1995
• Laotian refugee wave: Year of immigration is 1986 
through 1996
• Iraqi refugee wave: Year of immigration is 1992 
through 2000 and 2008 through 2015
• Somali refugee wave: Year of immigration is 1989 
through 2007and 2010 through 2015
However, due to data availability and coding 
issues in ACS, I decided to select only Vietnamese, 
Cambodian, Romanian, Russian, and Iraqi refugees to 
compare with economic migrants and natives. Due to 
the coding of the ACS data, the Russian refugee group 
contains individuals born in Russia and other former 
Soviet Republics excluding the European states. The 
same cohorts of refugees are followed over time to 
trace their labor market assimilation process. Due to 
this research design, the age of the refugees would 
increase with the census year. The ACS data are then 
analyzed using descriptive statistics and multiple 
regression to determine whether refugees perform 
more poorly in the US labor market than economic 
immigrants and natives do. Detailed explanation of the 
regression model will be discussed in the empirical 
model section. 
     V.          Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are used to compare the labor 
market outcomes and human capital of refugees, other 
immigrants, and natives for all adults aged 18 to 65. 
Table 1 presents the average real wages of individuals 
across all nativity groups for respondents who were 
employed full-time year-round, which means that 
they would have worked at least 30 hours per week 
for at least 48 weeks in the past year. Note that the 
2011-2015 time period includes a pooled sample from 
the five ACS annual surveys. Inflation is taken into 
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account by adjusting the annual labor wages to real 
wages using the CPI data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, with 2015 being the base year. Thus, real 
wages are expressed in terms of 2015 prices. As seen 
in the table, average real wages for all five refugee 
groups increased from 2000 to 2011-2015, which in-
dicates that overtime their US labor market outcomes 
did improve. 
Table 1: Average Real Wages of Full-time Year-round 
Employed Individuals across All Nativity Groups in 
2000 and 2011-2015
2000 2011-2015
Natives $51,609.31 $56,268.27
Economic Migrants $48,314.86 $52,923.63
Vietnamese Refugees $49,526.04 $62,733.93
Cambodian Refugees $36,054.31 $45,855.05
Romanian Refugees $56,519.17 $67,935.87
Russian Refugees $52,777.84 $71,310.43
Iraqui Refugees $35,640.26 $40,720.77
Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics 
summary for all nativity groups in 2000 and in 2011 to 
2015, respectively. These tables include the employ-
ment rate, usual hours worked per week, as well as the 
educational attainment level and English proficiency 
of all working-age adults. All descriptive variables are 
taken as the mean of each nativity group. 
We can see that in both tables, Vietnamese, 
Romanian, and Russian refugees performed excep-
tionally well in the US labor market decades after 
their arrival in the US. In Table 2, when compared 
to natives and other immigrants in 2011-2015, these 
three refugee groups had a higher employment rate, 
worked more hours per week, and were more likely 
to obtain a bachelor’s degree or higher. They also had 
better English proficiency than all the other groups 
besides natives. Moreover, these three refugee groups 
were older on average compared to natives and oth-
er immigrants. Since age serves as a proxy for labor 
market experience, which is an important indicator to 
an individual’s human capital, it can be assumed that 
older individuals have more labor market experience, 
potentially US labor market experience, and hence 
have higher human capital. The key observation to 
be made here is that groups with higher human cap-
ital tend to have better labor market outcomes. This 
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seems to agree with my hypothesis that when refugees 
acquire US-specific human capital, such as English 
proficiency and labor market experience, they improve 
their labor market performance over time and assim-
ilate to the US labor market. The regression analyses 
in the empirical section will further test my hypothesis 
on the relationship between human capital and labor 
market outcomes of refugees. 
On the other hand, Cambodian refugees 
showed some degree of employment assimilation but 
were not as successful as their Vietnamese, Romanian, 
and Russian counterparts. In 2000, they had lower 
employment rates and worked less hours than natives 
and economic migrants did. They also were the nativ-
ity group that was least likely to receive a bachelor’s 
degree or higher. The good news is that their labor 
market performance improved in 2011-2015. Their 
employment rate and average usual hours worked per 
week were similar to those of natives and economic 
migrants, but still had not fully caught up with them. 
They still had the lowest percentage of individuals 
who had obtained a bachelor’s degree or higher of all 
nativity groups, but the number increased from 9% in 
2000 to 16.6% in 2011-2015. Their level of English 
proficiency also increased, and along with the increase 
in age, we can assume that as a group, their human 
capital was higher, which could explain their improved 
labor market outcome.
However, not all refugees seemed to have 
assimilated to the US labor market after decades in the 
country. The labor market outcomes of Iraqi refugees 
are still considerably below those of native workers 
and economic migrants in 2011-2015. On average, 
their employment rate is roughly 20% lower than that 
of natives and economic migrants, and they worked 
nine hours less than the two reference groups. In fact, 
their labor market outcomes were worse in 2011-
2015 than in 2000 despite the increase in their human 
capital as indicated by the increase in the number of 
individuals who had obtained a bachelor’s degree or 
higher as well as English proficiency and age. This 
deterioration in the Iraqi refugee labor outcomes could 
not be explained by lower human capital, and hence 
supports my hypothesis that factors other than human 
capital, such as discrimination, play a part in determin-
ing the labor market assimilation process of refugees 
in the US. I will examine the extent to which discrim-
ination affects the employment outcomes of refugees 
further in depth in the empirical section. Nonetheless, 
it is important to note that since there were still new 
Iraqi refugee arrivals in the US during 2011-2015 as 
given in their definition, these newly arrived refugees 
were not given sufficient time to assimilate and hence 
the descriptive statistics results might be biased by 
including these refugees in the analysis. 
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     VI.          Empirical Model and Results
 In addition to descriptive statistics, multiple regres-
sion analyses are used to better examine the labor 
market integration of refugees in comparison to the 
two reference groups: economic migrants and natives. 
To determine whether discrimination exists for refu-
gees in the US labor market, I performed the Oaxaca 
wage decomposition analysis to test whether the wage 
differentials between refugees and the two reference 
group arise from discrimination or differences in hu-
man capital. The decomposition analysis is run twice, 
first with a sample of the refugee groups and non-ref-
ugee immigrants, and secondly with a sample of the 
refugee groups and natives. This approach allows me 
to estimate the effect of being in the refugee groups 
compared to the two reference groups, respectively.
The Oaxaca decomposition technique focuses 
on the raw wage differential between the supposedly 
discriminated group, which is refugees in this case, 
and the reference group. This raw wage differential is 
computed by finding the difference between the mean 
real wages of the refugees and the mean real wages of 
the reference group. The main purpose of the Oaxaca 
decomposition is to identify the portion of the wage 
differential that is due to human capital differences 
and the portion that is due to discrimination. To per-
form the decomposition, I first took the mean of the 
dependent and independent variables for all nativity 
groups (Vietnamese refugees, Cambodian refugees, 
Romanian refugees, Russian refugees, Iraqi refugees, 
economic migrants, and natives). Only individuals 
who were employed full-time year-round were se-
lected to conduct the wage decomposition analysis. 
Next, I ran a multiple regression analysis for each 
nativity group using the following regression equation:
where  is a constant,  stands for the coefficients for the 
independent and controlled variables denoted by, and  
is the error term. Table 4 below presents the variables 
taken into account in my regression analyses along 
with a brief description of each variable.
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The Oaxaca wage decomposition equations that 
measure the extent to which discrimination and skill 
differences contribute to the raw wage differential 
between the five refugee groups and the two reference 
groups are as presented below:
where  is the mean of the refugees’ real 
wages, is the mean of the economic 
migrants’ real wages,  is the mean of the 
natives’ real wages, and , , and  denote 
the mean of the independent and controlled variables 
as listed in Table 4 for refugees, economic migrants, 
and natives respectively. 
The raw wage differential is consisted of two 
parts; the first part, 
is called the differential due to discrimination, and it 
measures the extent to which the wage gap is affected 
by discrimination against refugees. It would be posi-
tive if employers perceive that the skills of economic 
migrants as more valuable than those of refugees
, or they simply prefer economic mi-
grants over refugees . The second part of 
the equation , measures the wage 
differential that arises from differences in skills, such 
as human capital, which cannot be attributed to dis-
crimination. In other words, this second part looks at 
what the refugees should be paid according to their 
skills if they were treated as economic migrants, and 
hence is called the differential due to skills. If there 
exist discrepancies in the demographic and human 
capital variables of refugees and the economic mi-
grants, then we can argue that part of the wage gap 
is due to differences in skills in these groups, not 
discrimination (Borjas, 2016). The same analysis is 
conducted to break down the wage differential be-
tween natives and refugees into differential due to dis-
crimination and differential due to skills to determine 
the effects of discrimination on refugee labor market 
assimilation in the US.
The constants ( ), coefficients ( ), and mean 
values of each variable ( ) obtained through the 
regression and descriptive analyses for each nativity 
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group are inserted into the decomposition equations. 
The final decomposition regression equations are 
expressed as:
Equation 1:
Equation 2:  
Again, all labor wages are expressed in real 
terms by adjusting the annual labor wages to real 
wages using the CPI data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, with 2015 being the base year. Equation 1 is 
run for each of the two time periods (2000 and 2011-
2015) on the same cohort of refugees to capture the 
assimilation process of the refugees in comparison to 
economic migrants. Equation 2 focuses on the wage 
gap between natives and refugees across both periods; 
the YrsUS variable is removed from the equation since 
it is not applicable to the native population. 
If the differential due to discrimination,
 is 
positive, I can confirm my hypothesis that refugees are 
disadvantaged in the US labor market in comparison 
to economic migrants and natives due to discrimina-
tion. 
Tables 5 and 6 below present the wage de-
composition results for refugees versus economic 
migrants and natives for years 2000 and 2011-2015 
respectively. The regression results that contain 
the constant and coefficients of each variable for 
each nativity group are included in the appen-
dix. The first row shows the real wage advantage 
the reference groups (economic migrants and na-
tives) have over each of the five refugee groups 
. A 
positive number indicates that on average, the refer-
ence groups earn more than the refugees and hence 
enjoy a positive wage advantage over the refugees. On 
the other hand, if it is a negative number, on average, 
the reference groups earn less than the refugees and 
hence have a negative wage advantage relative to 
refugees. 
The figures in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that 
discrimination plays a significant role in determin-
ing the wage differentials between refugees and the 
two reference groups as the wage differential due to 
discrimination does not equal to zero. For example, 
in Table 5, the Russian refugees earned $4,462 more 
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than economic migrants did in 2000, and if they were 
treated as economic migrants and paid according to 
their skills, they should have earned $12,030 more 
than economic migrants did. However, this is coun-
tered by the wage advantage of $7,585 that economic 
migrants enjoyed over Russian refugees due to the 
existence of discrimination. Similarly, on average, 
economic migrants earned $7,745 more than Iraqi 
refugees did in 2000 due to differences in their skills, 
and on top of that, they enjoyed another wage advan-
tage of $4,925 over the refugees due to discrimination 
against Iraqi refugees, which amounts to a total wage 
gap of $12,674 between the two groups. It is worth 
noting that discrimination can also work in favor of 
the refugees. In 2000, Romanian refugees had a wage 
advantage over economic migrants of $1,335, which 
suggests that employers found these refugees a more 
favorable group to employ based on non-human capi-
tal reasons. 
Similar results can be found when com-
paring the real labor wages of the refugee groups 
and of natives. As seen in Table 5, if Russian ref-
ugees received the same returns to their human 
capital and demographic variables as natives and 
are paid entirely according to these variables, they 
should have earned $13,858 more than natives did 
in 2000. However, discrimination caused them to 
earn $12,693 less than natives, so natives enjoyed 
a total wage advantage of $1,168 over the Russian 
refugees instead. For Iraqi refugees, discrimination 
accounts for $11,599, which is 73%, of the $15,969 
wage gap between them and the natives in 2000.
When comparing the results in Table 5 and 6, 
we can see that the labor market outcomes improved 
for refugees in 2011-2015. Those refugees who were 
already earning more than economic migrants and na-
tives in 2000 gained a greater wage advantage over the 
reference groups in 2011-2015. For example, in 2000, 
Russian refugees earned on average $4,462 more than 
economic migrants and $1,168 more than natives, but 
in 2011-2015, they earned $18,386 more than econom-
ic migrants and $15,042 more than natives. In some 
cases, the refugees who previously received lower 
wages than the reference groups ended up having a 
positive wage advantage over the reference groups. 
For instance, on average, Vietnamese refugees re-
ceived $2,083 less in labor wages in comparison to na-
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tives in 2000, but they turned out to earn $6,465 more 
than natives in 2011-2015. In other cases, even those 
refugees who did not enjoy a wage advantage over 
the reference groups managed to decrease the size of 
the wage gap between them and the reference groups, 
such as the Cambodian and Iraqi refugees. However, 
for Iraqi refugees, the size of differential due to dis-
crimination increased from 2000 to 2011-2015 despite 
the decrease in the magnitude of the actual wage gap. 
Another intriguing result is that employers preferred 
Romanian refugees over both economic migrants and 
natives in 2011-2015. This further suggests that there 
are differing characteristics that besides the human 
capital and demographic variables that are controlled 
for among the five refugee groups that would affect 
the labor market outcomes of refugees in the US. 
     
VII.          Conclusion
 As one of the world’s top destinations for 
immigration and humanitarian resettlement, the United 
States continues to welcome immigrants from a great 
variety of background. With the growing size of the 
refugee population in the country, it is important to 
measure the success of integrating refugees in the US 
labor market in comparison to economic immigrants 
and natives and hence evaluate the effectiveness of the 
US resettlement program for refugees. In this paper, I 
chose to focus on refugees from five countries: Viet-
nam, Cambodia, Romania, Russia and other USSR 
states, and Iraq. I used data over two time periods, 
2000 and 2011-2015, to create snapshots of each refu-
gee group’s assimilation experience. 
 By analyzing US Census and ACS data with 
descriptive statistics, it is shown that in Year 2000 (see 
Table 2), refugees on average had lower employment 
rates, worked fewer hours per week, and earned lower 
wages compared to economic migrants and natives. 
This phenomenon can be largely attributed to the 
lower levels of human capital, especially US-specific 
human capital, possessed by these refugees, as indi-
cated by their limited English skills and lower educa-
tional attainment levels. This finding is in accordance 
with the human capital theory, which states that higher 
levels of human capital would lead to better outcomes 
in the labor market. Since refugees initially had lower 
US-specific human capital and their human capital 
38 The Park Place Economist, Volume XXVI
from their home country is only partially transferable 
in the US labor market, they performed more poorly 
in comparison to economic migrants and natives when 
they first arrived. Discrimination from employers 
against refugees might also have impacted the labor 
market performance of refugees in the short-run. This 
is supported by evidence from my Oaxaca wage de-
composition analysis as indicated by the wage differ-
ential due to discrimination figures.
 However, over time, most refugee groups 
exhibit signs of assimilation to the labor market. They 
became more likely to be employed, worked for lon-
ger hours per week, and received higher earnings than 
they previously did. Even within the refugee groups, 
there are varying degrees of success in labor market 
assimilation. Vietnamese, Romanian, and Russian 
refugees are found to do exceptionally well, with their 
labor market performance, as well as educational 
attainment, eventually exceeding that of other immi-
grants and native workers. Cambodian refugees also 
improved their labor market outcomes and demon-
strated signs of closing the gap between them and the 
reference groups. Their success in assimilation can 
be seen to stem from improvements in human capital, 
especially US-specific ones, which requires time to 
acquire. They became more likely to obtain higher ed-
ucational attainment levels and spoke better English. 
Discrimination against these refugees might have 
diminished in the long run as employers learned more 
about them. In fact, the 2011-2015 Oaxaca decompo-
sition results show that employers preferred Vietnam-
ese, Romanian, and Russian refugees over economic 
migrants and natives, and thus discrimination worked 
in favor of these refugees. Hence the empirical results 
support my hypothesis that in the short-run, refugees 
perform worse than economic immigrants and natives 
do in the US labor market, but they do assimilate in 
the long-run.
 On the other hand, Iraqi refugees did not expe-
rience as smooth an assimilation experience as the oth-
er refugee groups did. In 2011-2015, they experienced 
higher unemployment rates and worked fewer hours 
than they did in 2000 despite an improvement in edu-
cational attainment and English proficiency among the 
Iraqi refugees. This suggests that human capital theory 
cannot solely explain the assimilation processes of 
refugees in the US. The Oaxaca decomposition results 
show that in 2011-2015, although the Iraqi refugees 
did manage to close the wage gaps with the reference 
groups slightly when compared to the 2000 results, 
economic migrants and natives enjoyed a greater wage 
advantage due to discrimination over Iraqi refugees 
than before. Hence discrimination worsened for these 
refugees. The increased anti-Islam sentiment in the US 
in recent years provides a possible explanation to this 
phenomenon. 
 Since my empirical results support my hy-
pothesis that discrimination plays a crucial part in 
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determining the labor market assimilation process of 
refugees, it would be helpful if future research can in-
vestigate more in depth the discriminatory factors that 
lead to the varying degrees of success in assimilating 
to the US labor market experienced by the five refu-
gee groups. Another suggestion for future research is 
to create interaction terms between the refugee status 
and human capital variable. Creating interaction terms 
for educational attainment would help us determine 
whether obtaining a bachelors, masters, professional, 
or doctorate degree would lead to the same returns on 
earnings for refugees, economic migrants, and natives, 
and hence provide a better insight for how human 
capital contributes to the labor market assimilation 
for refugees. Closer examination on the situations in 
different refugee source countries might also help us 
understand the discrepancies in the assimilation pro-
cess of the different refugee groups. 
 Overall, my research finds that refugees are 
initially worse off in the US labor market upon their 
arrival years than non-refugee immigrants and natives 
in terms of employment rate, usual hours worked per 
week, and labor wages, but over time they improve 
their labor market outcomes and assimilate. This is 
largely due to their gain in US-specific human cap-
ital skills, which increases with their years of US 
residence. However, the discrepancy in the results 
among the five refugee groups after controlling for 
human capital variables also suggests that discrimi-
nation might affect the labor market assimilation of 
refugees, especially more so for Iraqi refugees. This is 
supported by the results from performing the Oaxaca 
wage decomposition analysis. Hence when design-
ing the humanitarian resettlement programs in the 
US, policymakers should focus more on job training 
resources to improve the refugees’ human capital, such 
as language classes to improve English proficiency 
and easier access to higher education institutions, in 
order to better integrate refugees in the labor market. 
Another important aspect of humanitarian resettlement 
would be to create a refugee-friendly environment and 
thus hopefully minimizing the effects of discrimina-
tion. In conclusion, this paper supports the assertions 
of existing literature on the labor market performance 
of refugees versus economic immigrants and natives 
while shedding light on relevant issues that should be 
further investigated to help better estimate the rela-
tionship between refugee status and employment. 
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Appendix
Table 1: Regression Results of Refugees and Economic Migrants in 2000
Variable 
Name
Vietnamese 
Refugees
Cambodian 
Refugees
Romanian 
Refugees
Russian 
Refugees Iraqi Refugees
Economic 
Migrants
Constant -53206.2 -13642.9 -69086.5 -11381.4 9498.984 -15298
Female -10722.8***(-13.432)
-7587.09***
(-6.086)
-19066.3***
(-4.244)
-13965.8***
(-11.941)
-7381.66**
(-1.997)
-15184.5*** 
(-102.013)
YrsUS 783.538*** (7.298)
340.054
(0.994)
242.152
(0.295)
2631.071***
(9.67)
737.982
(0.97)
368.132***
(51.861)
Age 3208.543***(9.795)
2238.466***
(4.472)
3820.517***
(2.597)
1967.472***
(4.681)
424.72
(0.369)
1592.122***
(32.934)
AgeSQ -38.051***(-9.732)
-27.5***
(-4.484)
-45.685***
(-2.59)
-28.575***
(-5.641)
-3.221
(-0.219)
-16.113***
(-27.747)
Married 4102.188***(4.16)
3057.227**
(2.048)
-1286.83
(-0.23)
3288.597**
(2.202)
-2363.64
(-0.606)
5042.562***
(29.941)
NChild -1.518(-0.004)
-1085.25**
(-2.23)
2496.618
(1.383)
-726.65
(-1.227)
418.787
(0.302)
-6.345
(-0.101)
English 6951.683(1.543)
-2340.32
(-0.438)
37799.29
(0.912)
-3687.01
(-0.535)
4770.868
(0.416)
4498.821*** 
(14.016)
High-
School
4180.39***
(3.196)
2521.275
(1.535)
387.131
(0.049)
595.201
(0.201)
6278.261
(1.373)
7074.809***
(33.091)
Some-
College
13196.07***
(11.621)
7606.283***
(4.635)
5206.33
(0.687)
6067.76**
(2.122)
12075.16**
(2.542)
15438.77***
(73.195)
Bache-
lor’s
35697.14***
(28.827)
22701.71***
(9.876)
16817.8**
(2.098)
22834.69***
(8.229)
18837.03***
(3.716)
37638.97***
(164.056)
Master’s 50022.08***(24.114)
40483.63***
(8.358)
39185.9***
(4.551)
35620.79***
(12.297)
31494.68***
(3.547)
57140.88***
(188.209)
Profes-
sional
68973.55***
(25.936)
66653.72***
(7.571)
73987.2***
(6.651)
37371.34***
(9.885)
48658.13***
(4.981)
81353.72***
(186.359)
Doctor-
ate
62941.37***
(13.514)
62982.44
(6.205)
70050.43***
(4.757)
48189.65***
(13.6)
57376.98***
(2.919)
66312.85***
(135.652)
Adjusted 
R-Square 0.193
0.168 0.147 0.120 0.105 0.202
Sample 
Size 10526 1630 703 6110 416 496463
*Significant at the 0.10 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; ***Significant at the 0.01 level
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Table 2: Regression Results of Refugees versus Economic Migrants in 2011-2015
Variable 
Name
Vietnamese 
Refugees
Cambodian 
Refugees
Romanian 
Refugees
Russian 
Refugees
Iraqi 
Refugees
Economic 
Migrants
Constant -55952.2 -968.201 -211633 -141916 -18698.9 -45309.2
Female -10828.3***(-11.399)
-9282.31***
(-5.24)
-22484.5***
(-4.439)
-18465.2***
(-12.823)
-8244.1***
(-2.915)
-15559.4***
(-125.526)
YrsUS 1229.792***(9.907)
636.683
(1.628)
835.164
(0.998)
1548.937***
(5.576)
947.365***
(5.216)
405.656***
(72.283)
Age 2129.964***(3.6)
811.616
(0.749)
10038.05***
(4.742)
6459.94***
(12.398)
1824.075**
(2.023)
2660.724***
(61.876)
AgeSQ -23.779***(-3.873)
-8.505
(-0.75)
-110.123***
(-4.791)
-76.665***
(-13.019)
-17.404
(-1.601)
-27.994***
(-56.596)
Married 5356.656***(4.529)
1606.767
(0.788)
-2518.87
(-0.424)
8911.632***
(5.04)
9025.527***
(2.74)
6234.327***
(44.029)
NChild 1252.207*** (2.766)
562.912
(0.753)
994.585
(0.443)
-364.029
(-0.503)
-5230.79***
(-4.592)
331.643***
(5.978)
English 3561.228(0.697)
-4672.53
(-0.568)
19722.52
(0.408)
19274.73
(1.032)
-5706.59
(-0.552)
5496.6***
(19.261)
High-
School
2730.901
(1.639)
6075.662
(2.358)
9692.988
(0.878)
2528.535
(0.476)
6028.287
(1.442)
7212.529***
(38.168)
SomeCol-
lege
15519.47***
(10.718)
12100.07***
(4.918)
20244.94**
(1.849)
10163.28**
(1.991)
6505.343
(1.494)
17144.09***
)89.695)
Bachelor’s 45895.91***(30.183)
39513.46***
(13.336)
41626.16***
(3.635)
40458.93
(8.061)
23901.82***
(5.873)
43859.23***
(223.908)
Master’s 69620.67***(31.99)
60541.23***
(13.483)
56833.01***
(4.606)
61077.92
(11.934)
36860.85***
(5.752)
68640.38***
(292.964)
Profes-
sional
121246.6***
(44.59)
110159.5***
(10.812)
166971.4***
(10.988)
95627.81***
(16.826)
95481.66***
(2.921)
114087***
(294.311)
Doctorate 90021.59***(24.776)
52080.64***
(4.142)
115259.7***
(6.432)
85386.81
(14.837)
35043.07***
(3.504)
85498.34***
(230.464)
Adjusted 
R-Squared
0.278 0.213 0.252 0.208 0.238 0.262
Sample 
Size 12137 1825 764 7572 1038 768672
*Significant at the 0.10 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; ***Significant at the 0.01 level
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Table 3: Regression Results of Refugees and Natives in 2000
Variable 
Name
Vietnamese 
Refugee
Cambodian 
Refugee
Romanian 
Refugee
Russian 
Refugee Iraqi Refugee Natives
Constant -43787.1 -8672.01 -64232.2 5641.516 11568.42 -30445.8
Female -10555.9***(-13.195)
-7500.72***
(-6.031)
-19107.9***
(-4.258)
-13948.6***
(-11.837)
-7383.14**
(-1.998)
-18032.1***
(-50.446)
Age 3322.391***(10.129)
2278.353***
(4.567)
3787.265***
(2.584)
2000.79***
(4.725)
469.303
(0.408)
2523.145***
(21.431)
AgeSQ -38.673***(-9.869)
-27.851***
(-4.548)
-45.241***
(-2.576)
-28.423***
(-5.569)
-3.729
(-0.253)
-23.923***
(-16.737)
Married 3915.074***(3.962)
3088.535**
(2.069)
-1286.29
(-0.23)
3249.888**
(2.16)
-2236.08
(-0.573)
5648.326***
(14.08)
NChild 5.121 (0.014)
-1152.16**
(-2.39)
2494.619
(1.383)
-496.016
(-0.832)
473.714
(0.342)
1053.642***
(6.029)
English 8567.923*(1.899)
-2154.04
(-0.404)
36910.9
(0.894)
798.829
(0.115)
4882.025
(0.426)
6323.01
(0.607)
HighSchool 4712.309***(3.599)
2700.493*
(1.654)
244.277
(0.031)
-534.803
(-0.179)
6931.721
(1.532)
5648.176***
(8.243)
SomeCol-
lege
14402.63***
(12.788)
7784.018***
(4.771)
5148.004
(0.68)
5654.866**
(1.963)
12707.24***
(2.701)
14516.04***
(21.384)
Bachelor’s 37524.56***(30.865)
22996.96***
(10.09)
16728.12**
(2.09)
22119.97***
(7.915)
19233.27***
(3.807)
37265.52***
(50.56)
Master’s 52314.72***(25.45)
40768.09***
(8.431)
38986.27***
(4.545)
34435.26***
(11.809)
32242.22***
(3.645)
49114.19***
(52.157)
Professional 71546.63***(27.076)
67033.24***
(7.622)
73971.61***
(6.654)
36281.15***
(9.529)
49325.34***
(5.062)
77462.6***
(59.012)
Doctorate 65420.11***(14.049)
63125.71***
(6.22)
70137.93***
(4.767)
46057.75***
(12.926)
55828.18***
(2.85)
59715.08***
(31.105)
Adjusted 
R-Squared
0.189 0.168 0.147 0.120 0.105 0.171
Sample Size 10526 1630 703 6110 416 77835
*Significant at the 0.10 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; ***Significant at the 0.01 level
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Table 4: Regression Results of Refugees versus Natives in 2011-2015
Variable 
Name
Vietnamese 
Refugee
Cambodian 
Refugee
Romanian 
Refugee
Russian 
Refugee
Iraqi 
Refugee Natives
Constant -40844.1 11546.37 -192955 -108158 -23764.2 -58989.7
Female -10819***(-11.344)
-9272.24***
(-5.232)
-22867.4***
(-4.528)
-18671.3
(-12.944)
-7339.15***
(-2.568)
-19030.5***
(-118.65)
Age 2837.452***(4.812)
1029.184
(0.957)
10155.71***
(4.805)
6370.568***
(12.208)
2030.17**
(2.226)
2972.938***
(57.321)
AgeSQ -29.364***(-4.784)
-10.231
(-0.906)
-111.297***
(-4.849)
-75.523***
(-12.808)
-17.355
(-1.577)
-26.722***
(-44.111)
Married 5270.656***(4.439)
1706.842
(0.837)
-3086.31
(-0.522)
8948.105***
(5.05)
9151.997***
(2.744)
6535.548***
(36.259)
NChild 1057.628**(2.329)
515.172
(0.689)
1129.425
(0.504)
-314.191
(-0.433)
-5169.62***
(-4.481)
2511.755***
(30.815)
English 5579.798(1.089)
-4138.59
(-0.503)
20568.74
(0.426)
20701.41
(1.107)
223.139
(0.021)
17026.31***
(3.864)
HighSchool 3775.104**(2.261)
6625.831***
(2.593)
9570.085
(0.867)
2089.315
(0.393)
7062.854*
(1.67)
7055.788***
(17.228)
SomeCollege 17323.78***(12.012)
12666.09***
(5.198)
20080.94*
(1.835)
9507.651*
(1.86)
8061.171*
(1.833)
16536.86***
(41.094)
Bachelor’s 49157.52***(32.982)
40422.17***
(13.885)
41748.84***
(3.646)
39877.73***
(7.931)
23299.41***
(5.655)
42346.51***
(102.375)
Master’s 73709.4***(34.358)
61531.8***
(13.825)
56262.94***
(4.565)
60307.54***
(11.764)
36953.56***
(5.694)
54934.57***
(119.331)
Professional 125596.5***(46.618)
111363.3***
(10.954)
166978.5***
(10.988)
95563.97***
(16.781)
96390.14***
(12.884)
106300.3***
(171.014)
Doctorate 93818.25***(25.862)
53160.85***
(4.232)
115745.3***
(6.461)
84142.84***
(14.603)
35578.02***
(3.513)
76361.27***
(98.013)
Adjusted 
R-Squared
0.272 0.213 0.252 0.204 0.218 0.219
Sample Size 12137 1825 764 7572 1038 424607
*Significant at the 0.10 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; ***Significant at the 0.01 level
